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Rippley: Natural Resources - The Wyoming Supreme Court Articulates a Test

NATURAL RESOURCES-The Wyoming Supreme Court Articulates
a Test for Minerals. Miller Land and Mineral Company v. State
Highway Commission of Wyoming, 757 P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1988).
John L. Miller owned land west of Crowheart, Wyoming. At the
time of his death in 1977, Miller owned both the surface and mineral rights to the real property.' Following Miller's death, his estate
conveyed the real property involved in the dispute to Dale and Patricia Urbigkit' Subsequently, the Urbigkits sold the property to
the Mitchells. The deed to the property contained the following reservation:
Reserving unto Grantor, all minerals and mineral rights existing under said above lands and premises or appurtenant thereto,
together with the right3 to enter upon said lands to explore for
and produce the same.

Under the reservation, Miller's estate retained all of the mineral rights.
Pursuant to an order in the decree of distribution, Miller's estate conveyed all of the mineral rights to the Miller Land and Mineral Company by an administrator's deed.4
When the Urbigkits still owned the property they contracted to
sell gravel to the State of Wyoming for use on a highway project. 5 The
Urbigkits assigned all of their rights under the contract to the Mitchells when the Mitchells bought the property.' The State of Wyoming
agreed to pay the Mitchells approximately fourty-four cents per ton
for the gravel.' Pursuant to the contract, the State removed approximately 105,000 tons of gravel from the Mitchell's land for use in the
highway project.'
In October of 1985, Miller Land and Mineral Company (Miller)
owner of the mineral rights, sent a letter to the State Highway Commission (State) stating that sand and gravel were minerals, and that
Miller was the owner of the mineral rights. Miller further asserted that
the royalties for the removal of the minerals should be paid to them.
Miller sent a similar letter to the Mitchells 9 The State replied in part
that unless sand and gravel were specifically reserved to the grantor,
1. Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 757 P.2d 1001, 1002

(Wyo. 1988).
2. Id.
3.Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The materials agreement also provided for the sale of stone, sand or soil,
as needed. Id. at 1005 n.2.
8. Id.
9. Brief for Appellees State of Wyoming, et. al. at 2, Miller Land & Mineral Co.
v. State Highway Comm'n, 757 P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1988) (No. 87-288).
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or unless the land was subject to the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, 10
the sand and gravel were part of the surface estate. 1
In September of 1986, Miller filed a claim against the State of Wyoming pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. 12 Miller and
the Mitchells both moved for summary judgment. The trial court
granted Mitchell's motion. 13
Miller appealed this decision to the Wyoming Supreme Court, which
affirmed summary judgment. The court held that the mineral reservation expressed an "unambiguous intent by the grantor to reserve
all the minerals, whatever they may be.' 1 4 The court further held that
gravel is not a mineral and "insofar as gravel is concerned" the court
adopted the "ordinary and natural meaning" test for determining what
constituted a mineral. 5
This casenote contemplates the advisability of the Wyoming
Supreme Court's adoption of the "ordinary and natural meaning" test
to determine whether a substance is a mineral. Specifically, it considers
such an adoption in light of Wyoming's precedence of using extrinsic
evidence to construe reservations of minerals, and the historical role
taken by the court in Wyoming in interpreting a written instrument
for the conveyance or reservation of a mineral interest.
BACKGROUND

Prior to Miller the Wyoming Supreme Court has interpreted reservations or conveyances of mineral interests by the use of extrinsic evidence. Three decisions in Wyoming prescribe law on the interpretation of a reservation or conveyance of a mineral interest. The first
important case interpreting such a reservation was Houghton v. Thompson.'6 In Houghton the Wyoming Supreme Court decided that facts
showing the relationship of the parties, the surrounding circumstances,
10. 43 U.S.C. § 299. This portion of the Stock-Raising Homestead Act provides
that entries and patents issued under the provisions of the Act are subject to a mineral
reservation held by the United States. The Act calls for the reservation of "coal and
other minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect
for, mine and remove the same."
11. Brief for Appellees State of Wyoming at 2.
12. Stipulation of Facts at 6, Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm'n,
No. 24325 civ. (9th Dist. Wyo. 1988). The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is codified at Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-120 (1977). The purpose of the Act is to balance
the respective equities between persons injured by the government with the taxpayers
of Wyoming. The Act allows people to sue the government of the State of Wyoming.
13. Miller, 757 P.2d at 1001.
14. Id. at 1002-03.
15. Id. at 1004. The "ordinary and natural meaning" test that the State uses is
articulated in Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. at 518, 217 S.W.2d 994 at 997 (1949).
16. 57 Wyo. 196, 115 P.2d 654 (1941). This case was an appeal from the lower court's
denial to order specific performance of a contract which conveyed an interest in oil and
gas. The contract called for conveyance of a certain percentage of the profits earned
from the production of "petroleum, oil, gas or other hydrocarbons thereon encountered".
The court allowed extrinsic evidence in to interpret the contract. However, the court
found that the extrinsic evidence was favorable to the defendant, therefore upheld the
lower court.
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and the purpose for making the contract should be considered, as well
as the writing itself,
in interpreting a contract for the conveyance of
17
a mineral interest.

The court affirmed this position later in Dawson v. Meike. 18 In
Dawson, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided that a deed reserving
"oil, gas and kindred minerals" did not include uranium. The court
stated that in interpreting a mineral reservation the question to be
discerned is the intent of the parties. 9 The court, however, showed their
reluctance to actually admit extrinsic evidence where the terms of the
deed were sufficiently clear to determine its meaning.2"
Recently, in Cheyenne Mining and Uranium Company v. Federal
Resources Corporation,the Wyoming Supreme Court continued its commitment to use of extrinsic evidence in the case of an ambiguous mineral
conveyance."' The court asserted that the basic purpose of contract
interpretation was to determine the intent of the parties and that extrinsic evidence may be used to determine
the intent when interpreting
22
a conveyance of a mineral interest.

The Tenth Circuit has also considered cases where construction of
reservations of mineral interests was the major issue. The cases break
down into two broad categories, those which hold that the reservation
of the mineral interest is ambiguous 22 and those which hold that the
17. Id. at 658.
18. 508 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo. 1973). In Dawson, plaintiffs sought to recover a share
of monies from the rental of a mineral lease. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the deed in question, reserving interests in "oil, gas and kindred minerals" did not reserve an interest in uranium.
Therefore, the plaintiffs could not share in returns from uranium. The court quoted
Houghton with favor, but found that in this case there was no claim that the surrounding facts had any bearing on the parties intention. Thus the court found the reservation here clear enough to convey the meaning without looking to the surrounding circumstances.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 694 P.2d 65 (Wyo. 1985). At issue in Cheyenne, was a contract for the purchase and sale of unpatented uranium mining claims. The royalty owner under this
contract sued the purchaser seekihg to rescind the contract or in the alternative to
enforce the term of the contract. The District Court awarded $3,306 to the royalty owner.
Royalty owner appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court contending that the lower court
improperly limited the award because of its interpretation of the contract. The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded and said that in interpreting a conveyance of a mineral
interest a court may consider extrinsic evidence.
22. Id. at 70.
23. The Circuit, using primarily Wyoming law, in Lazy D Grazing Association
v. Terry Land and Livestock, 641 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981) found that sand and gravel
were not part of a reservation of "other minerals valuable as a source of petroleum".
The court said that the use of the word "valuable" was ambiguous in that case as it
applied to minerals, but unambiguous with respect to all other minerals. The court
allowed testimony from persons who participated in the negotiation of the sale in order
to learn the intent of the parties.
In United States v. 1253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972) the 10th
Circuit, applying Colorado law, found that extrinsic evidence should be used in construing a reservation of "all minerals". The court held that the reservation was inherently ambiguous and admitted a letter into evidence showing the intent of the parties.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1990

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 25 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 10

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXV

reservation is unambiguous.24 By ambiguous, the court means that the
reservation or conveyance is subject to many different and perhaps
inconsistent meanings. In contrast, when the court finds a reservation
unambiguous, it means that the language is clear enough for the court
to determine exactly what is reserved. When the Tenth Circuit has held
reservations of minerals to be ambiguous, they have used extrinsic evidence to interpret what the parties meant to reserve.2"
Many state cases have relied on extrinsic evidence to construe reservations of minerals.2 6 One of particular note is Puget Mill v. Duecy.2 7
In PugetMill, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington concluded
that the word "minerals" was not a concrete or definite term, but instead
was susceptible of many different meanings. The court found that the
term could, therefore be limited or extended according to what the intention of the parties was in using the term. The court called for the use
of extrinsic evidence and a rule that all cases should be decided on "the
language of the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances
and the intention of the grantor if it can be ascertained. ' 28
There are also many cases which hold that general reservations
of minerals are not ambiguous. An interesting contrast to Puget is an
Arizona case, Spurlock v. Santa Fe PacificR. Co.2" In Spurlock the Court
of Appeals of Arizona took the opposite approach of the Puget court.
The Spurlock court found that the best approach when dealing with
mineral reservations was to treat the term "minerals" as unambiguous. The court explicitly rejected using extrinsic evidence to determine
the meaning of a mineral reservation. The court's rationale was that
in this manner the court could determine the extent of the reservation
as a matter of law, rather than get caught up in "a complex and hopeless search for the 'true intentions' of the original contracting parties."'
The intent of the court was to avoid the situation where similar or identical reservations produce opposite results. Finally, the court concluded
that general reservations of minerals in Arizona retained "all 2commer1
cially valuable substances which are distinct from the soil. 3
24. In Amoco Production Company v. Guild Trust, 636 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1980)
the court affirms the District Court's conclusion that deed language reserving "coal
and other minerals" is not ambiguous, and that such language reserves oil and gas.

The Circuit Court goes so far as to say the if the Wyoming Supreme Court had to decide
the issue they would decide the same. With this statement the court is referring specifically to the holding that oil and gas are reserved. However, the court may also be implying that the Wyoming Supreme Court would rather hold that reservations of minerals
are unambiguous.
25. Lazy D Grazing Assoc. v. Terry Land and Livestock, 641 F.2d 844, 848-49 (10th
Cir. 1981); United States v. 1253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 1972).
26. West v. Godair 538 So. 2d 322 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989); Continental Group Inc.
v. Allison, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981); Resler v. Rogers, 272 Minn. 502, 139 N.W.2d 379
(Minn. 1965); Carlson v. Minnesota Land and Colonization Co., 13 Minn. 361, 129 N.W.
768 (1911).
27. 1 Wash. 2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939).

28. Id. at 427, 96 P.2d at 574.
29. 143 Ariz. 469, 694 P.2d 299 (1984).

30. Id. at 478, 694 P.2d at 309.
31. Id. at 479, 694 P.2d at 311.
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Courts which have found the use of "minerals" in a reservation
unambiguous have relied on other means to determine what "minerals"
encompasses. The Supreme Court of Texas embraced a rule which it
believed would give effect to the intent of the testator. The Texas
Supreme Court followed the "ordinary and natural meaning" test in
Heinatz v. Allen, and argued that in this case, the testator, who reserved
the minerals was presumed to be familiar with the "ordinary and
natural meaning" of the words she used to devise her mineral estate.32
The question in Heinatz was whether commercial limestone was
included in a devise of "mineral rights" in a plot of land. When it decided
this question, the Texas Supreme Court stated that, "[W]e must look
to the evidence as to the nature of the limestone, its relation to the
surface of the land, its use and value, and the method and effect of its
removal."" The court went on to say that if there was nothing that

manifested an intention to use "mineral" in its scientific or technical
would be construed as to their
sense, then the words "mineral rights"
"ordinary and natural meaning."34 The court also made a point that
it did not consider gravel or limestone to be a mineral, unless it had
a special value.35 The court stated, "In our opinion substances such as
sand, gravel and limestone are not minerals within the ordinary and
natural meaning of the word unless they are rare and exceptional in
character or posses a peculiar property giving them special value.... ",'6
Later, in Moser v. United States Steep 7 the Supreme Court of Texas
modified the "ordinary and natural meaning" test to eliminate the economic element in some instances. The court held that a severance of
minerals in an "oil, gas and other minerals" clause incorporated all
matter within the ordinary and natural meaning of those words whether
their value or existence is known at the time of the severance.3
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Miller,the court was faced with the question of whether a reservation which reserved "minerals" included gravel.3 9 The Wyoming
Supreme Court focused on the proper way to interpret a written instrument which conveyed a mineral interest.4"
The court stated that if the instrument was unambiguous the court
could look exclusively to the instrument to determine the intent of the
parties. 41 The court, however, also admitted that in Wyoming, even if
32. Heinatz v. Allen 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
33. Id. at 517, 217 S.W.2d at 995-96.
34. Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
38. Id. at 102.
39. Miller, 757 P.2d at 1001.
40. Id. at 1002.
41. Id. In addition, interpretation of an instrument to determine whether it is
ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide.
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the instrument was unambiguous the court could consider extrinsic
evidence if it wanted to.42
In contrast the court noted that when the terms of an instrument
were ambiguous, courts had to resort to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties.4 3 However, the court stated that courts
which have found a reservation of "all minerals" inherently ambiguous have traveled down a "long and torturous" path in attempting to
determine the subjective intent of the grantor. This long and tortuous
path led to the use of inconsistent and confusing approaches. These
approaches led to varied results and as a consequence, the term
"minerals" meant whatever the particular court said it meant in each
case.4 4 The court also noted that, finding a reservation of "minerals"
ambiguous45 created title uncertainty and the need to relitigate in many
instances.

Based on these conclusions the court decided that in order to avoid
such pitfalls, they would not consider extrinsic evidence to construe
the meaning of "minerals". Instead the court held that the reservation expressed a clear and unambiguous intent by the grantor to reserve
all minerals "whatever they may be". 46 Therefore, in the estimation
of the court, the question became whether gravel is a mineral, not
whether the grantor intended to reserve gravel.4 7
The driving force behind the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision
was that it did not like the results of deciding that the reservation of
"all minerals" was inherently ambiguous. The court stated that holding a reservation ambiguous only led to a futile search for the intent
of the parties and the need to relitigate each general reservation of
minerals.4"
The court summarily considered such tests as surface destruction,
special value and manner of enjoyment." It concluded that these tests
were confusing and spawned inconsistent results.50 Since this particular issue was one of first impression in the State, the court was free
to adopt any test it chose. The court held that gravel was not a mineral
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1003.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1002.
49. Id. at 1004 n.2. The surface destruction test states that a grant or reservation
of a mineral should not include a substance that must be removed in a manner that
will destroy the surface estate.
The special value test states that any substance that was reserved that was of
value at the time of the reservation, is a mineral.
The manner of enjoyment is a test that was first articulated by Professor Kuntz,
former Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming. Kuntz's theory states that the
only way one can enjoy a mineral is to extract it, thus anything extractable from the
ground that you can sell is a mineral under this theory.
50. Id. at 1003-04.
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and adopted the "ordinary and natural meaning" test in the belief that
a "clear rule of law" is of great importance in order to cut down on
litigation of similar factual issues and to minimize title uncertainty. 1
Justice Rooney filed a concurring opinion wherein he commended
the majority for attempting to set forth a rule that would minimize
litigation and title uncertainty. However, Rooney expressed his displeasure with the "ordinary and natural meaning" test. He doubted
that this test would in deed accomplish the stated objectives. 2 Rooney
instead advocated application of the usual rules of construction previously used by Wyoming to interpret reservations of mineral interests.53
Justices Thomas and Cardine filed specially concurring opinions.
Justice Thomas liked the end result of finding gravel is not a mineral,
however he expressed displeasure with the "ordinary and natural meaning" test. Thomas advocated an "inherent value" test whereby any
mineral, that at the time of the conveyance had inherent value, would
be recognized as included in a general reservation of minerals. 4
Justice Cardine offered the approach of simply holding that gravel
is not a mineral. He advised parties wishing to reserve gravel to do
so in the reservation. Such a holding he argued, would be without
ambiguity and easily applied."
The court held that a mineral reservation "[r]eserving unto Grantor, all minerals and mineral rights existing under said ...

lands"

expressed a clear and unambiguous intent by the grantor to reserve
all minerals whatever they may be.56 A majority of the court held that
gravel was not a mineral, but the Court did not reach an agreement
as to what test to apply. The court agreed the question was whether
gravel is a mineral, not whether the grantor intended to reserve gravel.
ANALYSIS

The court felt compelled to abandon the intentions of the parties,
so as to articulate a "clear rule of law."5 7 The policy considerations in
favor of a clear rule of law are significant in that the rule will minimize
title uncertainty and continued litigation. 8 The clear rule of law set
forth by the court is the "ordinary and natural meaning" test. Just
as many of the other tests summarily rejected by the court59 , this test
is confusing and inconsistent. Furthermore the test does not achieve
51. Id. at 1004.
52. Id. at 1005 (Rooney, J., concurring).
53. Id. Namely the rules concerning extrinsic evidence as set out in Dawson,
Houghton, and Cheyenne.

54. Id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1008 (Cardine, J., concurring).
56. Miller, 757 P.2d at 1004.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1003-04.
59. Id. at 1004 n.2.
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the desired ends - a clear rule of law, cutting down on the need to
litigate and title uncertainty.
The court's first major objective was to establish a clear rule of law. °
The "ordinary and natural meaning" test is anything but a clear rule
of law.6 One never knows how the ordinary and natural meaning is
to be determined and at what time this determination is to be made.
Within the last 100 years oil and natural gas have come to play a key
role in our economy and energy needs. In 1850, oil and gas certainly
were not of the import that they are now. It became ordinary and natural
to think of oil and gas as minerals as they became imperative to society. When society depletes fossil fuels in the future so that they fall
to minor importance, the ordinary and natural meaning of the term
minerals may no longer include oil and gas. The scenario is speculation, but it points out that contrary to the objectives of the Wyoming
Supreme Court, the "ordinary and natural meaning" test is not a clear
rule of law. Rather, the test is time specific and nebulous.
Texas has had nothing but problems since it adopted the "ordinary
and natural meaning" test. The test as set out in Heinatzwas a multifaceted test. The test encompassed elements which took into account
the economic value of the mineral and whether removal would destroy
the surface. 2 The Texas Supreme Court in Moser cut back on the ordinary and natural meaning test by eliminating the element of value.
The court stated
that whether the substance was of value or not was
63
irrelevant.

The Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the test as it was first set
out in Heinatz,thus the court adopted the complex version of the test.
This test encompassed elements which the court specifically rejected.
The test in Heinatz included an element of economic value and surface destruction, in Millerthe Supreme court rejects both of these tests
summarily.' The court by adopting a complicated and unworkable test
is in the same position Texas was in before it modified the test. Even
with modification and simplification the "ordinary and natural meaning" test will not solve any of the problems the Wyoming Supreme Court
claims it will.
The court's second major objective in adopting the ordinary and
natural meaning test was to minimize litigation and title uncertainty. 5
The "ordinary and natural meaning" test will do neither. Miller by
its narrow holding may in fact lead to increased litigation, "[W]e join
the vast majority of courts and hold that gravel is not a mineral, and,
60. Id. at 1004.
61. Lowe, What Substances are Minerals? 30 Rocky Mtn. Min.L. Inst. § 2.05[11]
at 2-20 (1984).
62. Heinatz v. Allen 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W. 2d 994 (1949).
63. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102.
64. Miller, 757 P.2d at 1004. See supra notes 16-48 and accompany text for an
enumeration of the tests the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected.
65. Id.
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insofar as gravel is concerned, we adopt... the ordinary and natural
meaning test.... "66 The holding reads as if the only substance the
"ordinary and natural meaning" test applies to is gravel! If the court's
objective truly is to minimize title uncertainty, it failed. If someone
wants to know whether a reservation of minerals includes other substances such as, limestone they cannot be certain the same test will
apply. Under its holding the court could articulate different tests for
other substances. Thus an owner will not be certain of his status until
a test for the particular substance he is interested in has been articulated. The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the problem when it
said that courts which have relied on various doctrines to determine
what is a mineral "spawn confusion, inconsistent results, and litigation to resolve questions of fact". 7
One commentator has suggested that, "The only way to be certain
of title to an unnamed substance is to litigate."6 The court, however,
criticizes use of the extrinsic evidence test for increasing litigation. This
argument fails in the face of the reality, that application of all existing tests may produce increased litigation.
The more persuasive argument for defining minerals, in this light,
is Justice Rooney's concurring opinion in Miller. Rooney argued for
using the extrinsic evidence test.6 9Rooney stated that the "least defective, best, and more accurate approach for such purpose is through application of the usual rules of construction and established Wyoming precedent.7" In Puget Mill the Supreme Court of Washington, in rejecting
a "comprehensive" test to define minerals recognized that "[t]he better rule is that each case must be decided on the language of the grant
or reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the intention of the
grantor if it can be ascertained."7 1
Wyoming precedent directs the court to use extrinsic evidence when
construing the meaning of minerals in a reservation. Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court need not articulate a new test at all. Extrinsic
evidence would do at least as much to further the Wyoming Supreme
Court's goals as the "ordinary and natural meaning" test does.
CONCLUSION

Despite precedence for using extrinsic evidence to interpret a reservation of minerals the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the "ordinary
and natural meaning" test. The court felt compelled to articulate a clear
rule of law to minimize title uncertainty, and cut down on the need
to litigate every reservation of minerals. The "ordinary and natural
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1004 (emphasis added).
757 P.2d at 1003-04.
Lowe, supra note 58.
Id.

70. Id. at 1005.
71. Puget Mill v. Duecy 1 Wash.2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 at 574 (1939).
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meaning" test does not accomplish these objectives. The court should
not have embraced such an ambiguous and inconsistent standard. The
court should have admitted extrinsic evidence in this case to determine
the intent of the parties when they reserved the minerals. Allowing
extrinsic evidence would do much more to further the court's objective
to articulate a clear rule of law and minimize litigation and title uncertainty.
P. JAYE RIPPLEY
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